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NOTES
State Taxation of Interstate Business-Looking Toward FederalState Cooperation
The growth of multistate businesses, the increased mobility of the
population, and the rise of mass advertising have changed the
complexion of the American marketplace. Markets that were formerly
local have become regional and national. Radio and television
advertising has attracted customers from a multistate area.
Nevertheless, while modern business has tended toward multijurisdictional operations, the trend in state taxation has been toward
pushing the state's jurisdiction to tax to its constitutional limits.
Moreover, due to the complexity of state tax laws, even a small business
often incurs tax liability in several different states. Many of these taxes
result in expenditures of time and money disproportionate to the amount
of taxes actually owed.
Congress, the states, and the business community are aware of the
discrimination against interstate operations created by multistate
business taxation. They disagree, however, on the nature of the problem,
on what should be done, -and on who should do it. Some see the basic
problem as a lack of jurisdictional certainty, which could be resolved
through federal legislation. To others, the problem is lack of uniformity
in taxing multistate businesses and the solution is a multistate tax
compact.
This note will review the historical setting of state taxation of
interstate commerce and examine the problems created by the diversity
of state tax laws. It will further discuss the two different approaches
toward solving these problems, investigate the constitutional issues
involved in the proposed solutions, analyze their inadequacy, and
recommend a federal-state cooperative approach.
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL

INTERESTS

Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress lacked authority to
regulate interstate commerce. As a result, legislation in this field was left
entirely to the individual states.' Continuing disputes erupted because
I. See B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, pt. 1,
at 178-79 (1963); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 126
(abr. ed. 1833).
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each state exercised its taxing power over interstate commerce without
regard to the interests of the adjoining states or of the nation as a whole,2
and the states' unrestrained power to tax interstate commerce became
the power to destroy any opportunity for the growth of a vital national
economy .3 To remedy the lack of enforceable mutual concessions
regarding interstate commerce, the framers of the Constitution of 1787
included the commerce clause in the new compact of government., In
keeping with the remedial nature of the commerce clause, the United
States Supreme Court early held that the clause had force in the absence
of congressional action and that where Congress had not spoken, the
Court would protect the national interest. 5
For the next 170 years Congress was content to leave most of the
regulation of state taxation of interstate commerce in the hands of the
Supreme Court.' At the outset, relatively little regulation was required
for two main reasons. First, the states did not press their power to tax
interstate commerce. Secondly, the major tax until the Civil War was the
relatively simple property tax. In the late 1800's the Supreme Court's
role increased as a result of the states' growing need for revenue, which
resulted in the development of the capital stock, gross receipts, net
income, and sales and use taxes.7 Each of these taxes created its own
problems for multistate businesses. Moreover, in the absence of a
congressional policy, the Supreme Court had to act as a quasi-legislative
body in balancing the demands of the states for tax revenue and the
national need for a smooth flow of interstate commerce. The tests
devised by the Court in resolving these competing demands shifted with
the composition and attitude of the Court.'
2. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note I, at 238-40.
3. Cf. In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891); P. HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE
COMMERCE 2 (1953).
4. See E. DUMBAULD, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 112-39 (1964); A. KELLEY
& W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 293 (3d ed. 1963).
5. See Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 263 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring); Brown v.
Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)419 (1827).
6. W. BEAMAN, PAYING TAXES TO OTHER STATES, ch. 1, at 10 & ch. 2, at 2 (1963). One
instance of congressional action, however, was the McCarran Act in which Congress provided that
the states could regulate and tax insurance companies even though the Supreme Court had declared
insurance to be interstate commerce and not subject to state regulation. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15
(1964). For congressional comments on the McCarran Act see 1945 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 67073.
7. Cf Melder, Interstate Tax Barriers, in NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION, 1958 PROCEEDINGS
OF THE FIFTY-FIRST ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION 280,281 (1959).
8. In the early 1900's, Mr. Justice Holmes established the rule that a tax levied directly on
interstate commerce was invalid. This approach tended to favor free trade over state power to tax.
In the 1930's, Mr. Justice Stone established the "cumulative burdens" test which invalidated a state
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As multistate businesses began to increase in number and as the
states imposed more complex taxes on interstate businesses, members of
the Supreme Court began to call on Congress to take over the burden of
adjusting the competing interests? Congress, however, showed little
interest in the matter until 1959, the year the Court decided
Northwestern States PortlandCement Co. v. Minnesota."' In that case
the Court held that "net income from the interstate operations of a
foreign corporation may be subjected to state taxation, provided the levy
is not discriminatory and is properly apportioned to local activities
within the taxing state ... ."" The business community, fearing that
the decision would encourage the states to extend their tax jurisdiction
even further, rushed to Congress for relief. 12 Pressed by business
demands, Congress "reacted with astonishing speed and for the first
time in its history adopted an act [Public Law 86-272] restricting the
power of the States to tax interstate businesses."13
Public Law 86-272,1 passed within seven months of the decision in
Northwestern, established a minimum nexus requirement for a state net
income tax on multistate businesses selling tangible personal property.
The Act also authorized a comprehensive study of state net income
taxation of these businesses, which was later broadened to include all

matters pertaining to the taxation of interstate commerce by the states. 5
tax if it threatened to subject interstate commerce to the burden of multiple taxation. This approach
tended to favor the states' power to tax. In the 1940's a modified Holmes approach was in vogue
which allowed a state to impose an "indirect" tax on interstate commerce and yet to measure it by
an incident of interstate commerce. For a more complete treatment of the Court's attempt to adjust
the competing state and national interests in this area see P. HARTMAN, supra note 3, at 5-13.
9. E.g., Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 470-77
(1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176, 18889 (1940) (Black, Douglas, & Frankfurter, JJ., dissenting). See note 37 infra and accompanying
text.
10. 358 U.S.450 (1959).
II. Id. at 452. The business activities were exclusively in furtherance of interstate commerce.
12.

HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON STATE TAXATION OF

H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th
Cong. 2d Sess., vol. 1, at 7 (1964) [hereinafter cited as REPORT]. According to a less neutral view,
"certain well known propagandists . . . launched upon a campaign of propaganda, through their
affiliated trade associations, to pressure Congress into the enactment of some federal law which
would exaggerate the confusion which had previously existed in this area." Cox, The Impact of
Recent Supreme Court Decisions on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce. in NATIONAL TAX
ASSOCIATION, 1959 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION 441
(1960).
13. See J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 259 (3d ed. 1969).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1964).
15. Act of April 7, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-17, 75 Stat. 41 (1961), amending 15 U.S.C. § 381
(1958). This was the result of reaction to Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 US. 207 (1960), in which the
Supreme Court held that an out-of-state business could be required to collect a use tax on sales
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE,
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Shortly after the Willis Subcommittee study was completed in 1965,11 a
bill, H.R. 11798, was introduced to implement the Subcommittee's

recommendations. This bill would have limited state power to tax
interstate commerce, imposed a mandatory two-factor apportionment
formula for net income and capital stock taxes, and provided for direct
federal administration and adjudication of tax disputes. 7 After
numerous objections were raised during hearings on the bill, 8 the
Subcommittee introduced a new bill, which eliminated provisions for
direct federal administration and adjudication and made the mandatory
two-factor formula optional." Since no action was taken before the 89th
Congress adjourned, the bill died, 20but a new bill incorporating most of
these proposals has since been introduced.

The states, by this time, had become concerned over the threatened

"encroachment" on their traditional power to tax. Although the simple

solution seemed to be a tax compact, 21 the barriers to such interstate
made within the taxing state even though it maintained no facilities in the state and its sales were
made through independent contractors. The business community was disturbed by this decision and
feared that it would lead to a similar ruling on mail order catalogue sales. The pressure on Congress
for a federal statute was relieved somewhat when the Supreme Court decided National Bellas Hess,
Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 US. 753 (1967), which held that a state could not impose the
duty of use tax collection and payment upon a seller whose only connection with customers in the
state is by mail or common carrier. See Taylor, Multistate Tax Compact, 31 TEXAS B.J. 773, 822
(1967).
16. Volumes I and 2, H.R. REP. No. 1480, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), dealing with state
income taxes, were submitted to the Speaker of the House on June 15, 1964; volume 3, H.R. REP.
No. 565, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965), dealing with state sales and use taxes, capital stock taxes, and
gross receipts taxes, was submitted on June 30, 1965; volume4, H.R. REP. No. 952,89th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1965), containing the Subcommittee's recommendations, was submitted on September 2,
1965.
17. See text of H.R. 11798,89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), printed in Hearingson H.R. 11798 &
Companion Bills Before the Special Subcomm. on State Taxation of InterstateCommerce of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, Appendix 1, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 14, vol. 2, at 1447-512
(1966); 19 ABA TAXATION SECTION 111-12 (1965).
18. Representatives of both the states and the business community expressed opposition.
Hearings on H.R. 11798 & Companion Bills Before the Special Subcomm. on State Taxation of
InterstateCommerce of the House Comm. on theJudiciary.89th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 14 (1966).
19. H.R. 16491,89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); see Celler, The Development of a Congressional
Program Dealing with State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 385, 391
(1968).
20. Celler, supra note 19, at 390. Representative Edwin Willis (D-La.) reintroduced the bill as
H.R. 2158,90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), which passed the House, 284 to 89, and then died for lack
of Senate action at the end of the 90th Congress. Representative Peter W. Rodino, Jr., (D-NJ.)
later introduced the bill as H.R. 7906,91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969), which was passed by the House,
311 to 89, on June 25, 1969, but has not yet been enacted by the Senate.
21. See C. PENNIMAN & W. HELLER, STATE INCOME TAX ADMINISTRATION 243 (1959);
Ratliff, State Taxation of JnterstateCommerce: The Casefor Federal Control, in NATIONAL TAX
ASSOCIATION,

1962

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFrY-FiFTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION

513,

519 (1963); cf.NEw YORK JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE, REPORT ON INTERSTATE COOPERATION
271-75 (1961) [hereinafter cited as NEw YORK REPORT].
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cooperation were immense. "It would take time to draft a workable,
reasonable compact, and years to present it to all the legislatures and to
Congress. . . ...Furthermore, the states would have to overcome the
"inertia, neglect, provincialism, and inadequate appropriations to tax
administrators" that had made the states' record for cooperation with
one another in taxation so unimpressive. 23 By 1966, however, a

Multistate Tax Compact had been drafted, and it became effective in
1967 as the seventh state adopted it.2 A conflict between the two
competing approaches to state tax regulation was thus framed with a
federal interstate tax bill~ pending in Congress and a Multistate Tax
2
Compact in existence and gaining support.

II. THE
A.

PROBLEMS

Problems in Defining the "Common Market"

Except for the provisions of Public Law 86-272, enacted in 1959,
the Supreme Court has had to rely on constitutional limitations alone in

adjusting disputes involving multistate taxpayers challenging the
authority of states to impose certain taxes. The primary constitutional

provisions relied upon by the Court have been the vague "due process"
and "commerce" clauses. The purpose of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, which governs the relationship between the state

and, in this context, the taxpayer, is to insure fairness by protecting the
22. See 20 ABA TAXATION SECTION 151, 163 (Jan. 1967) (remarks of Arthur B. Barber).
23. See C. PENNIMAN & W. HELLER, supra note 21, at 242; Report of the Committee on
InterstateAllocation of Business Income in NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION, 1958 PROCEEDINGS OF
THE FIFrY-FIRST ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION 372, 373 (1959). But cf.NEW YORK JOINT
LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE, COMPACT ON TAXATION OF MOTOR FUELS CONSUMED BY INTERSTATE

BUSES 92-97 (1968).
24. On January 12-13, 1966, the National Association of State Tax Administrators held a
special meeting in Chicago, where there was support for a multistate tax compact. Later a drafting
committee was formed, and on December 20, 1966, the final draft of the Multistate Tax Compact
was published. It was to become effective when it was adopted by 7 states.
25. H.R.7906,91stCong., 1stSess. (1969).
26. See, e.g., ABA Committee on State and Local Taxes, Recommendation, in 22 TAX LAW.
1041 (1969) (recommendation that Congress enact an interstate taxation act and appropriate
legislation relating to the Multistate Tax Compact). The American Bar Association House of
Delegates approved legislation consenting to the Compact in its 1970 meeting at St. Louis,
Missouri. Report of ABA Annual Meeting, 39 U.S.L.W. 2110,2113 (Oct. 25, 1970). As of January
13, 1970, 19 states had adopted the Compact. These include Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. In addition, Alabama has adopted the
Compact subject to congressional consent. The following states are associate members (possessing
no right to vote or to hold office) of the Compact: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Indiana,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, and West
Virginia. P-H STATE TAX GUIDE
742-W, 743 (All States ed. 1970).
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taxpayer from unreasonable or extraterritorial state action. The courts
are generally competent to determine, as a matter of essential fairness,
when a state has a sufficient justification to warrant exercise of its power
over persons or corporations. 7 On the other hand, the commerce
clause,2 primarily concerned with relations between the nation and the
states, was written into the Constitution "to rescue [commerce] from the
embarrassing and destructive consequences, resulting from the
legislation of so many different States, and to place it under the
protection of a uniform law." Thus, the commerce cause was not
grounded on common law principles or on any principle of ultimate
need for
fairness, but rather on political and economic expediency-the
30
a "common market" area that would benefit all the states.
The commerce clause has two aspects. First, it is the express source
of power in the national government to regulate commerce among the
states. Secondly, it is a source of implied restraint on the power of the
states, even in the absence of federal legislation. 3 ' The Supreme Court's
problem has arisen from its attempt to use this second, negative aspect of
the commerce clause to formulate an affirmative policy whereby the
national interest in having a common market is not jeopardized by the
same state rivalries and provincial interests that made the commerce
clause necessary in the first place. The Court has had difficulty in using
the commerce clause in this manner as demonstrated by the various
approaches it has taken in adjusting the competing national and state
interests. Many of the decisions are a composite of due process and
commerce clause ideas;32 several rely on conclusions obscuring the basis
27. Cf. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); F. JAMES, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 644-49 (1965); Conlon, The Report of the Special Subcommittee: A Preliminary
Appraisal, in NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION, 1964 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL

CONFERENCE ON TAXATION 529, 536 (1965). This does not mean, however, that the judicial task is
an easy one, especially with regard to the taxing power. See V. WOOD, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 19321942, at 340-400 (1951).
28. "Unlike the due-process clause, which focuses attention on the inconvenience to the
defendant for his own protection, the commerce clause limitation is concerned with the imposition
on the defendant's business insofar as it serves to impair the public interest in an open economy in
our federal system." Note, Developments in the Law-State-CourtJurisdiction,73 HARV. L. REV.
909,985 (1960). For a discussion of the interrelationship of these two clauses see W. BEAMAN, Supra
note 6, ch. I, at 7, and Barrett, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce-"Direct Burdens,"
"Multiple Burdens," or What Have You?, 4 VAND. L. REV. 496 (195 1).
29. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I, I1 (1824). See also notes 1-4 supra and
accompanying text.
30. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 178.
31. See, e.g., Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249,263 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
32. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treas., 322 U.S. 340,355 (1944)
(Rutledge, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Rutledge's opinion, covering 3 cases, is an
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of the decision; 33 and others are based on considerations having no
economic significance.3 Since the Court has failed to give substance to

the commerce clause as the source of an affirmative policy, it is difficult
to predict which tax will be found to "unduly burden interstate
''

commerce."

Lacking any guidelines from the express words of the Constitution,
from common law experience, or from congressional legislation, the
Supreme Court has no special competence to accommodate the
conflicting interests of state and nation in defining the proper boundaries

of the common market that the commerce clause was to create and was
intended to protect.36 The Court cannot make " a detailed inquiry into

the incidence of diverse economic burdens in order to determine the
extent to which such burdens conflict with the necessities of national
economic life, neither can [it] devise appropriate standards for dividing
up national revenue on the basis of more or less abstract principles of
constitutional law, which cannot be responsible to the subtleties of the
interrelated economies of Nation and State . . . . ,, The commerce

clause, based on economic realities and not common law principles,
raises questions of a political nature more appropriately decided by a
political rather than a judicial body.ss The appropriate political body to
establish the national interstate commerce policy, according to the

Constitution, is Congress. Using the negative implications of the
commerce clause, the Court can only attempt to restrain the states from
destroying the common market goal of that clause while waiting for
Congress to define its boundaries and establish a method for protecting

it.
excellent discussion of the Court's difficulty in dealing with the due process and commerce clauses in
relation to state taxation of interstate commerce.
33. As an example, for many years the Court struck down "direct" taxes and upheld
"indirect" taxes. The test applied to invalidate a tax on this basis has been subject to considerable
criticism: "It gave very little help to the legislator, the lower courts, or the taxpaying businessman in
predicting whether a particular tax would be valid. The alleged test simply . . . described a result
reached, not the reasons for that result." P. HARTMAN, supra note 3, at 32.
34. See, e.g., P. HARTMAN, supra note 3, at 264; Barrett, "Substance" vs. "Form" in the
Application of the Commerce Clause to State Taxation. 101 U. PA. L. REV. 740 (1953). States can
frequently avoid the effect of these decisions and extract the same amount of tax from the same
multistate taxpayer merely by rewording their tax statutes. See Hartman, State Taxation ofIncome
from a Multistate Business, in SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF CORPORATE PRACTICE 36 ff.

Roady & W. Andersen eds. 1960); Powell, Contemporary Commerce Clause Controversies over
State Taxation, 76 U. PA. L. REV.773,774 (1928).
35. See International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treas., 322 U.S. 340, 358 (1944)
(Rutledge, J.,
concurring).
36. See H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIARY 42 (2d ed. 1969).
37. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 475 (1959)
(Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
38. See, e.g., H. ABRAHAM, supra note 36, at 42; P. HARTMAN, supra note 3, at 276.
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Problems Describedby Legal Writers

While one major constitutional problem-what the common
market policy inherent in the commerce clause should be-has been the
source of the Supreme Court's difficulties, legal writers have identified
and analyzed several additional problems in interstate tax relations. One
of the problems recognized as faced by multistate businesses is the great
degree of uncertainty about what the states will be allowed to tax.39
Another major problem is the diversity of tax laws among the states,
which leads to high administrative costs among taxpayers complying
with the laws.4" A third identified problem, stemming from the diversity
of tax laws, is the inequity among multistate taxpayers created by a
system that produces overtaxation or undertaxation.1' Not every state
utilizes the same apportionment formula, taxes the same transactions, or
defines terms the same as other states do. This causes some businesses to
be overtaxed by doing business in states that seek more than their share,
while other businesses are undertaxed as a result of doing business in
states with lax tax laws.
C.

Problems Foundby CongressionalStudy

Prior to the study of state taxation conducted by the Willis
Subcommittee in the early 1960's,42 there was no reliable empirical data
by which to evaluate the many problems believed to exist in interstate
tax relations. 3 As a result of its study, the Willis Subcommittee
concluded that there were four major defects" in the present state
39. See W. BEAMAN, supra note 6, ch. 4, at 6: "Thejudicial prescription of taxable nexus...
consists of a few inconclusive interpretations of the Due Process Clause and the unpredictable rule
which treats exclusively interstate commerce as exempt from 'direct' state taxation."
40. See C. PENNIMAN & W. HELLER, supra note 21, at 242-43. Diversity also results from
variations in interpretation and application of the tax laws. Id.
41. See W. BEAMAN, supra note 6, ch. 4, at 9; C. PENNIMAN & W. HELLER, supra note 21, at
243.
42. See note 16 supra.
43.

Hellerstein, An Academician's View of State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, in

NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION, 1960 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON

TAXATION 201,217 (1961).

44. See REPORT, supra note 12, vol. 4, at 1127-28. Jurisdiction, while not considered to be one
of the major defects, was considered to be a problem: "In determining tax liability, the threshold
question for every business which crosses State lines is that of jurisdiction.. . . The jurisdictional
provision of most State tax laws do very little to help .... " REPORT, supra note 12, vol. 12, at
594. Another problem faced by the multistate taxpayer is that of liability to political subdivisions
within a state. Although the taxpayer may have done the same thing in 2 cities of the same state, one
city may consider him liable for the tax and the other not. "But most bewildering of all, the State
...may consider him not liable on the basis of an activity within its borders while one of its
political subdivisions . . . may consider the same activity within its borders sufficient to create
liability for the local tax. Thus within each state a whole new world of confusion breeds." Id.
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taxation system: (1) the system was marked by a tendency toward

overtaxation and undertaxation; (2) local business was often favored
over interstate business; (3) there was widespread noncompliance with

state tax laws as a result of the burden of excessive compliance costs; and
(4) the system had generated an unhealthy attitude among taxpayers

concerning compliance with state tax laws. For the most part, the
Subcommittee simply verified the conclusions of the prior legal writers.
III.
A.

5

THE PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

The FederalApproach

One of the first federal attempts to resolve the problems of
multistate business taxation was the Harrison Bill of 1934,48 which
would have allowed states to tax interstate transactions subject to three
limitations. First, a state could levy a tax upon, or measured by, sales of
tangible personal property only in the same manner and to the same
extent as taxes were levied on like property not in interstate commerce.
Secondly, a state could not tax items transported for the purpose of

resale by consignees. Thirdly, political subdivisions of states could not
levy a tax upon, or measure it by, a sale of tangible personal property in
interstate commerce. a The bill was passed by the Senate but was not

enacted into law.4 8

Most writers, nevertheless, have continued to believe that

congressional action is necessary.

9

Some have argued that the

Constitution imposes a duty on Congress to remove all state
impediments to the free flow of commerce between the states." Others
have insisted that the states cannot realistically be expected to agree on
45. See Cox, Taxation ofInterstateBusiness, in NEw YORK JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE,
REPORT ON INTERSTATE COOPERATION 115, 116-18 (1965). For a critical evaluation of the
Subcommittee's study see 19 ABA TAXATION SECTION 111, 117-21 (July 1966).
46. S. 2897, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). Probably the first federal attempts to eliminate
difficulties in allocation of taxes of multistate businesses were S. 3074, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1931)
and H.R. 9692 & H.R.1 1950, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1931). Essentially the bills provided that
interstate business could be taxed in the same manner and to the same extent as intrastate business
provided the taxes were not discriminatory and the business or property was not subject to double
taxation. J. KALLENBACH, FEDERAL COOPERATION WITH THE STATES UNDER THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE 187 n.1 19 (1968). See generally Perkins, The Sales Tax and Transactions in Interstate
Commerce, 12 N.C. L. REV. 99 (1934).
47. S.2897, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
48. 78 CONG. REC. 4598 (1934).
49. For comments prior to 1959 see Dowling, Introduction: State Taxation of Multistate
Business, 18 OHIO ST. L.J. 3 (1957). For comments after 1959 see Hellerstein, State Taxation of
InterstateBusiness: Reflections on Legislative Directions.in TAX INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, FEDERALSTATE-LOCAL FISCAL RELATIONSHIPS 257,263 (1968).
50. See20 ABA TAXATION SECTION 151, 162 (Jan. 1967) (remarks of Arthur B. Barber).
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the substance and scope of uniform rules and to set aside local interests
in favor of national ones, 51 especially since multistate business taxpayers
are being taxed without representation in states where they have no
business location. Finally, writers have suggested that Congress is the
only political body having
sufficient authority to deal with the problem
52
manner.
adequate
an
in
1. The Recommendations.-In response to the congressional
interest created by the Supreme Court's holding in Northwestern and

the congressional enactment of Public Law 86-272, the Willis
Subcommittee recommended that formula apportionment be used as the
sole method of dividing the tax base among the states.5

3

Specific

allocation and separate accounting were to be eliminated. A two-factor
apportionment formula, based on property and payroll, was

recommended instead of the much used three-factor formula based on
property, payroll, and sales. 4 The recommended rule for jurisdiction to
tax allowed a state to assert net income tax jurisdiction over a multistate

business that had either property or payroll in the taxing state. The
starting point for computing state taxes was to be the federal tax base."

The Subcommittee also suggested that capital stock and gross receipt
taxes be subject to the same apportionment formula and jurisdictional
standard applicable to income taxes. It recommended, with respect to
sales and use taxes, that states either adopt a uniform sales and use tax
act, included in the recommendations, or retain their own tax system and
be subject to federal jurisdictional requirements." Furthermore, the
Willis Subcommittee urged that the United States Treasury Department

be given administrative responsibility for issuing rules regarding the
uniform division of income, power to modify the apportionment formula
51. Id. at 164 (remarks of Stephen C. Nemeth, Jr.).
52. Id. at 151 (remarks of Jess N. Rosenberg).
53. See REPORT, supra note 12, vol.4, at 1144.
54. This method of dividing income was recommended because it would reduce complexity,
thus lowering compliance costs, resulting in a higher level of compliance. Id. at 1144-45.
55. This recommendation was designed to eliminate complexity by relating jurisdiction to the
apportionment formula, both being based on property and payroll ("business location"). The result
was to be elimination of tax returns showing only small liabilities. Id. at 1156.
56. A closer conformity between state and federal definitions was to facilitate taxpayer
compliance, allow for more efficient tax administration, and reduce favoritism in the tax base. Id. at
1158.
57. Sellers in states electing the uniform act would be required to collect sales or use taxes for
any sale within the state. Sellers of tangible personal property making only prepaid mail order sales
with no other contact in the state, except advertising, would be exempt from collecting either tax. Id.
at 1181. States not electing the uniform act could only require sellers to collect the sales and use tax
if the sellers had real property, full time employees, or made regular household deliveries in the
taxing state. Id. at 1180.
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when inequity would result in a particular case, and power to resolve
multistate tax disputes. Under the bill, the Department also would be
authorized to study the interstate tax problems of businesses not
otherwise covered by the proposed federal legislation.
2. The Proposed Legislation.--Shortly after publication of the
Willis Subcommittee Report, a congressional bill5 was introduced to
implement the Subcommittee's recommendations. In the hearings on
this bill, 5 there was such widespread opposition to its provisions, from
business and states alike, that the bill was rewritten and reintroduced in
modified form,60 eliminating provisions recommending direct federal
administration, federal adjudication of tax disputes, use of the federal
tax base as a starting point for computation purposes, and the
uniform sales and use tax act. The remnants of the original
recommendations-the uniform jurisdictional standard based on a
business location test for income, capital stock, and gross receipts
taxes-are the basis of a bill presently pending Senate action. 61 In this
current bill a state may require collection of sales and use taxes if the
business meets the business location test or regularly makes household
deliveries in the state. The two-factor apportionment formula based on
property and payroll is available to taxable businesses as an option to
the state's method of determining the tax base for a net income or capital
stock tax. Moreover, the state may not impose a tax under its formula
greater than the maximum using the optional federal formula.
Businesses having average annual net incomes in excess of one million
dollars and certain other businesses engaged in designated activities are
excluded from the coverage of the bill.
B.

The State Approach

Another approach to solving the taxation problems, this time
through state action, came in 1957 with the drafting of the Uniform
Division of Income for Tax Purpose Act,6" which provided for an
58. H.R. 11798, 89thCong., 1stSess. (1965).
59. Hearings on H.R. 11798 and Companion Bills Before the Special Subcomm. on State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,89th Cong., 2d Sess., ser.
14 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
60. H.R. 16491, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). For a discussion of the major provisions of
H.R. 16491 see Glander, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce-A Review, in NATIONAL TAX
ASSOCIATION, 1966 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-NINTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION 286,

293 (1967).
61. H.R. 7906,91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); see note 20 supra.
62. See Lynn, The Uniform Division of Income for Tax PurposesAct Re-Examined. 46 VA.
L. REv. 1257, 1258 (1960); Pierce, The Uniform Division of Income for State Tax Purposes, 35
TAXES 747 (1957); Wilkie, Uniform Division ofIncomefor Tax Purposes, 37 TAXES 65 (1959).
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equitable division of the tax base of multistate businesses by the use of a
three-factor apportionment formula based on sales, property, and
payroll. It was hoped that the Act would be adopted in every state, thus
assuring that every multistate business would be taxed only on its entire
net income." This state action approach had several major flaws. First,
the Act assumed state jurisdiction to levy the tax in the first place.
Secondly, it did not establish a uniform definition of terms. Thirdly, it
did not provide that every state would have a net income tax and it did
not establish what the rates would be. Fourthly, it applied only to
corporate net income taxes and did not attempt to resolve the problems
of the gross receipts, capital stock, or sales and use taxes. Finally, since it
was not adopted by a substantial number of states, the desired
uniformity was not achieved. 64
Despite these flaws, state action has still been the choice of many
writers. The case for allowing the states to resolve the problem, however,
seems to have been based as much on opposition to federal
"intervention" as it has been on concern for the problems of the
multistate business.65 Many opponents of federal legislation have felt
that it would be an "unwarranted, unnecessary and undesirable
intrusion into the tax and fiscal jurisdiction to the states and their local
governments," and have opposed such legislation "because it would be
destructive of the principles of federalism." The attack on federal
legislation has been frequently directed against the Willis Subcommittee
study. Objections have been that the Subcommittee lacked any special
competence to evaluate the problems of state and local taxation and that
its conclusions were based on data gathered during the turbulent years
following the Northwestern decision and the enactment of Public Law
63.

See Hartman, State Taxation of Corporate Income from a Multistate Business, 13

VAND. L. REv. 21,76 (1959).

64. See W. BEAMAN, supra note 6, ch. 4, at 11. In 1965 only Alaska, Arkansas and Kansas, of
38 states imposing corporate income taxes, had enacted the uniform act. Hellerstein, A llocationand
Nexus in State Taxation oflnterstateBusinesses, in TAx INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, STATE AND LOCAL
TAXES ON BUSINESS 67, 75 (1965). By 1968 the number of states adopting the uniform act had risen
to I1, with the addition of California, Hawaii, Idaho, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South
Carolina (in part) and Utah (in part). NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS HANDBOOK 370 (1968).
65. See, e.g., Dexter, The CaseAgainst Federal Intervention, in TAX INSTITUTE OF AMERICA,
STATE AND LOCAL TAXES ON BUSINESS 98 (1964); 20 ABA TAXATION SECTION 152, 168 (Jan. 1967)
(remarks of T.W. DeLooze).
66. Statement by John W. Lynch, President, National Association of Tax Administrators,
on January 27, 1966, quoted in Bishop & Taylor, H.R. 11798, Reform or Ruin?, 29 TEXAS B.J. 247
(1966). See also Sparks, Taxation of Interstate Commerce: The Case for State Control, in
NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION,

TAXATION

505,510-11 (1963).

1962 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-FIFTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON
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86-272. 67 Furthermore, the report has been said to overemphasize
compliance costs and to disregard the equity of the present state tax
system considered as a whole.18 Some opponents have placed the burden
on Congress to prove that interstate taxpayers suffer an undue tax
burden and have claimed that since the Willis Subcommittee failed to
sustain the burden, Congress is without power to interfere. 9 Moreover,
opponents to federal action have believed that the existing system, even
with its faults, would be better than some federal system likely to cause
as many problems as it would solve.70 The most persuasive argument by
those in favor of state action has been that the states are in a better
position to determine state taxing requirements and to adjust a new
system of multistate taxation to the existing structure of state tax
administration.
Based on one or more of the above arguments, the approach
favored by many states is that of interstate cooperation-more
specifically, the Multistate Tax Compact. 71 The Compact allows any
multistate business to use the Uniform Division of Income for Tax
Purposes Act, rather than a particular state's tax laws, in determining
liability for net income taxes. 72 Small businesses are given the option to
pay a tax on gross sales in lieu of paying a net income tax.73 The
Compact further provides for credit to be given by the taxing state for
sales and use taxes previously paid to another state. Similarly, interstate
sellers are relieved from collection of sales or use taxes of the taxing state
upon good faith acceptance of a tax exemption certificate from that
state. A Multistate Tax Commission has been created to implement the
purposes of the Compact and to administer the program, conduct
studies, and make recommendations concerning problems as they arise.
Single audits of a multistate taxpayer are available on a multistate basis
in states choosing to become parties to a cooperative audit provision.
The Compact also establishes an optional arbitration procedure for
settling disputes concerning apportionments and allocations.
67. See Lock, A Moderate's Viewpoint on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 17 TAX
EXEC. 321,322-23 (1965).
68. See Bishop &Taylor, supra note 66, at 308; Lock, supra note 67, at 323-24.
69. See 19 ABA TAXATION SECTION 117 (July 1966).
70. See Dexter, supra note 65, at 98-99.
71. Cf. Taylor, Multistate Tax Compact. 30 TEXAS B.J. 773 (1967).
72. Multistate Tax Compact, art. I, § 3, reported in 27 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,
SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION C-9 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Multistate Tax Compact].
73. Multistate Tax Compact, art. I II, § 2.

1330

IV.

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[VOL. 23

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES INVOLVING THE PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

A.

Constitutionalityof CongressionalLegislation

The states greeted the enactment of Public Law 86-272 with attacks
on its constitutionality. 4 The attacks have failed for the simple reason
that the plenary power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce
embraces congressional action to limit, displace, or override state
taxation that might be permissible in the absence of federal action.75
Although the states maintain that the courts have not considered all the
possible grounds of attack on the statute, it seems apparent that the
states are fighting an uphill constitutional battle. 6 The Supreme Court
can be expected to uphold the constitutionality of Public Law 86-272, as
well as the proposed legislation, if it should be enacted into law.
B.

Constitutionalityof the Multistate Tax Compact

It seems rather anomalous that the states should attack the
constitutional power of Congress to regulate state taxation of interstate
commerce and yet join in a Multistate Tax Compact in the face of the
express constitutional prohibition of the compact clause. The Supreme
Court, however, has held that not all compacts among the states are
prohibited. As early as 1893, in Virginia v. Tennessee," the Court said
that the prohibition of the compact clause "is directed to the formation
of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the
States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of
the United States."" As a consequence of this and similar decisions,
74. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Cocreham, 246 La. 244, 164 So. 2d 314, cert. denied,
379 U.S. 902 (1964) (amici curiae briefs filed by 19 states); State e rel. Ciba Pharmaceutical
Prods., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 382 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. 1964); Smith Kline & French Labs. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 241 Ore. 50, 403 P.2d 375 (1965). See also Roland, Public Law 86-272:
Regulation orRaid?,46 VA. L. REv. 1172 (1960).
75. See cases cited note 74 supra. For a survey of case law on the scope of congressional
power see Hartman & Sanders, The Power of Congress to Prohibit Discrimination in the
Assessment of Property of Interstate Carriersfor State Ad Valorem Taxes, 33 ICC PRAC. J. 654
(1966). '
76. See Bishop & Taylor, The Proposed Interstate Taxation Act, 29 TEXAS B.J. 247, 309

(1966).
77. "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State...
U.S. CONST. art. !, § 10, cl. 3.
78. 148 U.S. 503 (1893). For a discussion of the early federal history of the interstate
compact see Frankfurter & Landis, The CompactClause ofthe Constitution-A Study in Interstate
Adjustments, 34 YALE LJ. 685 (1925). For later developments see F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL,
THE INTERSTATE COMPACT SINCE
OF INrRSTATE COMPACTS (1961).

79.

148 U.S. at519.

1925 (1951);

F. ZIMMERMAN &M. WENDALL, THE LAW AND USE
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only political compacts are now viewed as requiring congressional
consent. 0
1. Definition of Political Compact.-What constitutes a
"political" compact? The test seems to be dependent upon the degree to
which an interstate agreement may conflict with federal law or federal
interests.8 1 A compact should be considered void, in the absence of
congressional consent, when it has the tendency to disrupt national
interests and to encroach upon the responsibility of Congress to decide
questions of national concern.12 Generally, if the interstate compact
simply seeks uniformity of state services, state administration, or state
law within the normal realm of state responsibility, the compact is not of
a political nature.
One test advanced to determine whether a compact is political
sounds deceptively simple: "[I]f the states can seek uniformity of law by
statute without consent of the federal government, there is no reason why
the same words in an interstate compact require consent."' ' The real
question is, however, not whether the states would have authority to
regulate the subject matter when acting independently of a compact, but
whether the federal government would have the ultimate responsibility
and power to act upon the disputed matter even if traditionally subject to
state regulation. If a compact concerns a matter of national interest and
responsibility, such as interstate commerce, Congress should decide
whether the states collectively are more competent to regulate the subject
matter than the national government, and whether the states should be
allowed to unite into a political entity to regulate the subject matter. In
other words, if the states are unable to resolve a problem of national
magnitude through uniform laws, but instead must create a new entity
for complete and adequate action, then direct congressional action may
be more appropriate than collective state action 4
2. Congressional Consent.-The problem of deciding which
80. See, e.g., Dunbar, Interstate Compacts and CongressionalConsent. 36 VA. L. REV. 753,

756 (1950).
81. See F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS 23
(1961). See also 94 CONG. REC. 5677 (1948) (remarks of Senator Pepper): "Probably it [the
political compact] depends upon the degree of involvement in the compact, the number of
agreements entered into, the relative importance of the agreements, the scope of them, and the
general range of activity which is contemplated."
82. Cf.F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL, supra note 81, at 23.
83. F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL, supra note 81, at 24.
84. Cf. F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL, supra note 81, at 23: "The real test of the need for
Congressional consent in the present day is the degree to which an interstate agreement may conflict
with federal law orfederal interests. I f it runs any danger of conflict with federal law or the doctrine
of pre-emption, then the need for congressional consent is clearly indicated." (emphasis added).
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compacts are political can be ameliorated by looking first for some sign
of congressional consent. Although the Constitution does not specify
when or how the consent of Congress shall be signified, the Supreme
Court has held that consent may precede the compact or be given
subsequent to its existence,"' and further, that consent may be inferred
from the circumstances"6 and may be granted conditionally. Since
Congress has never voided an already effective compact,s and since the
Court can be expected to infer consent where there is no reason to
suppose that Congress is opposed to a compact, 9 it seems fair to say that
Congress impliedly consents to the existence of any compact of which it
has knowledge and has not negated by legislation."
3. ConstitutionalAnalysis of the Multistate Tax Compact.-It is
submitted that the Multistate Tax Compact is political in nature and is
prohibited by the compact clause-in the absence of congressional
consent.9 One reason for this conclusion is that the primary purpose of
the Compact is to lessen the necessity for federal action.9" Also, the
Compact seeks, in effect, to relieve Congress of its responsibility to
decide the proper scope of the common market intended by the
commerce clause. 3 Furthermore, the whole area of state taxation of
interstate commerce was a source of federal-state sensitivity long before
the Multistate Tax Compact was promulgated. 4 Present congressional
concern in this area can be demonstrated by the enactment of Public
Law 86-272, by the lengthy congressional study of such taxation, and by
a bill designed to limit state power to tax interstate commerce which has
been passed by the House and is pending Senate action." A final reason
for this conclusion is that the individual states were unable to resolve the
85. See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 US. 503 (1893). Congress has passed consent acts in
advance in several fields, including forest protection, crime control, and flood, control. F.
ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL, THE INTERSTATE COMPACT SINCE 1925, at 57 (1951).
86. See Virginia v. West Virginia, 78 US. (II Wall.) 39 (1870).
87. See James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 US. 134 (1937).
88. See F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL, supra note 85, at 40 n.17 1.
89. Cf.id.
90. See id.
91. Cf. ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 919, Note (Supp. 1967): "This act shall become effective...
upon the passage and approval by the congress [sic] of an act authorizing the various states to enter
into such Multistate Tax Compact."
92. See, e.g., Taylor, Multistate Tax Compact, 30 TEXAS B.J. 773-74 (1967): "The principal
cause of the battle has been such threatening federal legislation now pending in Congress as H.R.
2158. . . which is designed to curtail existing state and local taxing power .
93. See F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL, supra note 81, at 22.
94. See notes 1-9 supra,and accompanying text.
95. H.R. 7906,91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). See notes 13-20,58-61 supra and accompanying
text.
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problems and had to join together into a multistate entity that can be
fully effective only if all of the states become parties."
Assuming that the Multistate Tax Compact is political in nature
and requires congressional consent to be effective, the next question is
whether consent has been given. As yet there has been no express
consent, but there are good grounds for finding implied consent.
Congress clearly knows that the Compact is in existence, as evidenced by
the Compact consent bills9 7 pending in both houses of Congress. Even
though the Consent bills have not been enacted, there appears to be no
reason to suppose that Congress is opposed to the compact," especially
since it has failed to negate it.99 So long as Congress tolerates the
existence of the Compact there is no apparent reason for the judiciary to
strike it down as violating the compact clause. The courts should not
readily invalidate a cooperative experiment that could prove beneficial in
resolving a problem of almost two centuries' duration. Moreover, little
harm could be done in allowing the Compact to continue, at least until it
is certain that Congress disapproves of its existence. The mere finding of
an implied congressional consent, however, does not imply a
relinquishment or restriction of congressional power, including the
power to negate the Compact at any time by appropriate legislation or
the power to regulate interstate commerce and thus preempt contrary
state action. 1'0
V.

ADEQUACY OF PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

A.

PresentSituation

Has the multistate business taxpayer benefited from the proposed
efforts to simplify the state tax laws? Presently, a multistate business
must consult Public Law 86-272 to determine the jurisdictional standard
for state net income taxes. If a business is within the state's jurisdictional
reach for net income taxes, it must refer to state and local law in matters
of apportionment, administration, and interpretation of the tax laws. In
addition, it still must examine state and local law to determine
jurisdiction and liability for all other taxes. Businesses operating within
96.
97.

Cf. notes 62-73 supra and accompanying text.
E.g., S. 2804,91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969); H.R. 6246 & H.R. 9873,91st Cong., 1st Sess.

(1969).
98. Cf. Hogan, H.R. 2158 vs. The Multistate Tax Compact: Are They Mutually Exclusive?,
20 TAX EXEC. 93,96 (1968).
99. Failure to negate an existing compact within a reasonable length of time should be
sufficient to imply consent. See F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL, supra note 81, at 22.
100. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 US. (18 How.) 421, 433
(1856).
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states that are members of the Multistate Tax Compact must also
determine whether to use the optional apportionment formula of the
.Uniform Act and whether any other provisions of the Compact may
benefit them as taxpayers. The task of the multistate taxpayer, therefore,
has not necessarily been simplified by the federal "jurisdictional"
approach of Public Law 86-272 or by the multistate "uniformity"
approach. Furthermore, neither of the present approaches addresses
itself to the underlying policy of the commerce clause. The Supreme
Court is in no better position to determine whether the uniform
provisions of the Multistate Tax Compact are compatible with the
commerce clause than it was to determine whether the state tax in
Northwesternwas compatible with that clause.
B.

Possible FutureSituations

Assuming that the pending bill is enacted into law and that the
Multistate Tax Compact continues in existence, 1 ' the multistate
taxpayer is likely to find determination of his tax liability even more
difficult. The pending bill applies only to "small" businesses, creating a
source of litigation to determine which companies are excluded. Public
Law 86-272 would still apply to some of the excluded businesses. Not
only would the taxpayer have the option to choose either the state's
apportionment formula or the Compact's formula, both based on a
three-factor. formula and each with its own interpretative gloss, he would
also have the option to choose the federal two-factor formula.' Even if
the taxpayer did not choose the federal formula, it would impose an
upper limit on his tax liability. Thus, the taxpayer could determine his
maximum tax liability with the federal formula and then experiment
with all three formulas-state, Compact, or federal-to ascertain which
one would yield the lowest tax. This same process would have to be
repeated in each state in which the business operates and for each type of
tax, since the pending bill and, to some extent, the Multistate Tax
Compact, also cover the other major taxes imposed by the states.
Therefore, if the additional federal legislation is enacted and the
Compact is left intact, the multistate taxpayer will be faced with three
sets of laws by which to determine his state tax liability. 1°3 Prior to the
101.

"As a practical matter it is hard to see how both could remain operative for very long."

Hogan, supra note 98, at 96.

102. "Consider the dilemma of a taxpayer in a 'Compact' state, electing to adopt the threefactor formula of the Compact where H.R. 2158 may only have entitled him to the optional twofactor formula. The fact remains, the interstate tax problem continues to exist and should be
capable of a fair and equitable solution." Id.
103.

See Glander, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce-A Review, in NATIONAL TAX
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recent search for "solutions," he was simply confronted with a variety
of state laws.
Assuming that the pending bill is enacted into law and that the
Multistate Tax Compact ceases to exist, for whatever reason, the
multistate taxpayer would only be confronted with two federal laws in
addition to the variety of state laws. Although this situation would have
the advantage of a greater degree of simplicity, all future problems
would have to be resolved through federal or state legislation since there
would be no agency to administer a cooperative program.
VI.

COOPERATIVE COMPACT APPROACH

The enactment of a Compact consent bill could alleviate many of
the inadequacies in separate solutions by federal and state governments.
In addition to authorizing the Multistate Tax Compact, such a bill could
impose federal standards similar to those of the Compact, on states not
joining the Compact."'s The Compact consent bill could also contain a
congressional statement of the commerce clause policy to be applied by
the Supreme Court in situations not expressly covered by either the
Compact or the federal standards.
A.

The Necessityfor Cooperation

When a traditionally "state" problem begins to have adverse
effects on national interests, there are essentially three alternatives: (1)
leave the solution of the problem to the states, acting individually or
collectively; (2) solve the problem by federal legislation; or (3) resolve the
problem through federal-state cooperation. The present struggle between
the state and federal governments over control of state taxation of
interstate commerce tacitly recognizes only the first two of these
alternatives, both of which have become increasingly unsatisfactory. 105
Neither state nor federal action alone is likely to bring about an effective
1966 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-NINTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION 286,
292 (1966): "Taxpayers could actually have greater recordkeeping headaches than at present, and
filing requirements would increase for many more companies. . . great care must be taken to draft
and enact a measure which, in fact, will ease the burdens. . . rather than merely substitute a new set
of problems ..
"
104. Cf. S. 2804, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969), which would give congressional consent to a
multistate tax compact and would provide optional allocation and apportionment provisions,
similar to the Compact provisions, to taxpayers in states that have not adopted the Compact by July
1, 1971. Other provisions include tax limitations on political subdivisions and authorization to
impose, or require collection of, a sales or use tax on sales to a consumer within a taxing jurisdiction
where the seller regularly makes household deliveries.
105. See pp. 1325-29 supra; Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in InterstateA djustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685,688 (1925).
ASSOCIATION,
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coordination of taxes so long as there is a federal system of
government.106 Mere interstate cooperation, in the form of compacts or
uniform laws, cannot substitute for federal action on a problem affecting
a national interest.1 7 On the other hand, federal action alone is not
likely to increase harmony in federal-state relations where the states'
revenue source is at stake. The nation and the states must be treated as
mutually supplementing agencies of government, not as jealous rivals
for power.1es
B.

Federal-StateCompact

The only alternative to further conflict in the area of state taxation
of interstate commerce is joint federal-state action. It is submitted that
the most appropriate type of joint action would be a federal-state tax
compact. The use of federal-state compacts to resolve problems
involving federal and state interests has been urged for several years.'
The propriety of federal participation in a multistate compact seems
clear when a national interest such as interstate commerce is an
important facet of the compact.110 Moreover, the federal government has
already played a limited role in several regional interstate compacts."'
Recently it became a fully participating member of such a regional
compact, agreeing to substantially the same terms as the states."' If
governmental participation is proper and desirable in these regional
compacts, it would seem that such participation would be even more
appropriate in a multistate compact seeking to resolve a national
problem.
Congress and the states agree, in principle, on many of the goals of
106. Cf. Hartman, State Taxation of CorporateIncome from a Multistate Business. 13
L. REV. 21 (1959). Federal-state cooperation in taxation is not a recent development.
107. See Buonn, Production,PFrices,Incomes, and the Constitution, I I Wis. L. REV. 313,32021 (1936); cf. Macmahon, Introduction of PartIII, in FEDERALISM, MATURE AND EMERGENT 267,
269 (A. Macmahon ed. 1955).
108. Corwin, National-State Cooperation-ItsPresentPossibilities.46 YALE L.J. 599,601
VAND.

(1937).
109. See J.

CLARK, THE RISE OF A NEW FEDERALISM 72 (1938); E. ZIMMERMAN & M.
WENDELL, THE INTERSTATE COMPACT SINCE 1925, at 60 (1951); Robertson, Recent Developments in Federal-State Cooperation, in NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION, 1958 PROCEEDINGS OF

483,484-85 (1959).
110. Cf. Grad, Federal-StateCompact: A New Experiment in Co-operativeFederalism,63
COLUM. L. REV. 825 (1963). "Where matters of national interest are involved in a compact, the
THE FIFrY-FIRST ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION

federal government is concerned with the operation of the compact."
AGENCIES, SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS,

REPORT OF INTERSTATE COOPERATION

printed in NEw

CONFERENCE OF INTERSTATE

YORK JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE,

393,394-95 (1961).

11. See, e.g., The Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact, ch. 581, 54 Stat. 752
(1940) (3 members of the compact commission appointed by the President). See also West Virginia
cc rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 US. 22,27-28 (1951).
112. See Grad,supra note 110.
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a national interstate commerce tax policy.113 The main difficulty arises in
the choice of methods to be used and in the scope of the solution.
Although the states disapprove of federal intervention in the area of state
taxation, it is time for Congress to take action on the problems facing
the multistate taxpayer.' Congress, however, can and should fashion its
solution to give the states added incentive to work constructively toward
a multistate tax program compatible with the national interest. In the
event the states are unable or unwilling to cooperate, a solely federal
solution should be available.
C.

ProposedLegislativeApproach

The following discussion is intended to outline a legislative program
that could resolve many of the problems now facing the Supreme Court
in interpreting the commerce clause, encourage constructive state action
in resolving the problems faced by the multistate taxpayer while
preserving state responsibility for state tax policies, and guarantee a
large degree of uniformity. Although specific legislation is not
recommended, it is submitted that Congress should pass legislation
encompassing the following three general attributes.
First, Congress should define the proper boundaries of the common
market that the commerce clause was designed to create and protect."5
As previously discussed, this is the question that has given the Supreme
Court difficulty in resolving the conflicting interests between state tax
policy and national commerce policy. A common market policy could
be stated in general or detailed terms and could be in the form of an antidiscrimination provision, allowing non-discriminatory state taxation, or
in the form of a jurisdictional standard, establishing a "tax free" zone." 6
113. See, e.g., Hellerstein, State Taxation of InterstateBusiness: Reflections on Legislative
Directions, in TAX INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, FEDERAL-STATE-LOCAL FISCAL RELATIONSHIPS 257
(1968); Hogan, supra note 98, at 95.
114. See Glander, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce-A Review, inNATIONAL TAX
ASSOCIATION, 1966 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-NINTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION 286,
293 (1967).
115. See Harriss, State-Local Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Progressand Problems, in
NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION, 1966 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-NINTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON
TAXATION 294, 299 (1967). Congress needs "to establish a concept of some transcendent national
interest as a benchmark from which to work out the detail." Johnson, State Taxation ofInterstate
Commerce: Looking Toward Federal Legislation, in NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION, 1961
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-FOURTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION 333, 334-35 (1962).
116. An anti-discrimination policy would seem preferable. The jurisdictional approach can
solve the compliance difficulties of small businesses, but it does not help the financial problems of
the states or the tax problems of the local business that must compete with interstate commerce and
yet pay the tax that its competitors escape. See Sparks, note 66 supra, at 512. "A true federalism
suggests that interstate commerce and intrastate commerce be treated alike with no segment of this
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An anti-discrimination policy would emphasize the responsibility of
interstate commerce to pay its own way. On the other hand, the
jurisdictional approach would encourage business expansion and
eliminate compliance costs and tax liability completely for some
117
businesses.
Secondly, Congress should authorize the existence of a multistate
tax compact. With federal recognition and participation in the existing
Compact, its framework for further tax uniformity could be continued
without the necessity for establishing a new agency or beginning with
completely new legislation."" Such participation would give both federal
and state representatives the opportunity to consider all factors prior to
the establishment of any tax policy. The degree of federal participation
and the scope of authority of the federal representatives should be
limited, however, to encourage voluntary state action.
Thirdly, Congress should provide for an interstate taxation act that
would be applicable to non-member states." The purpose of this federal
alternative would be to encourage all states to join the Compact for a
more uniform approach to tax problems.' 20An interstate tax act, such as
H.R. 7906, would freeze state tax law into what is believed to be a
workable solution at the time the legislation passes. Most states would
national commerce enjoying any competitive advantage over the other." Johnson, supra note 115,
at 336. "The goal. . . should be to place interstate and local commerce, so far as possible, upon a
plane of tax equality." B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1,at 291.
117. Cf.Sparks, supranote 66, at 506.
118. Retention of the machinery of the present Multistate Tax Compact has been recently
urged by an ad hoc committee of state tax administrators and business representatives who met to
work out a compromise solution to the state and federal approaches. In a proposal submitted to the
Multistate Tax Commission at its meeting in Chicago on June 4, 1970, the Ad Hoc Committee
recommended a merger of the 2 approaches that would combine federal substantive provisions with
Multistate Tax Compact administration. Specifies of the proposal are discussed in 31 CCH STATE
TAx REv. No. 24, at 2 (June 16, 1970). The Commission passed a resolution approving in principle
the basic objective embodied in the proposal and the scope of its substantive provisions.
119. The federal provision should utilize as many as possible of the features of the Compact.
Any federal legislation should adopt the 3-factor apportionment formula which will provide
equitable results if applied uniformly. Most of the income tax states use the 3-factor formula which
business is accustomed to, and the 2-factor formula simply adds confusion to an already
complicated area. For a discussion of states electing the uniform act see note 64 supra and
accompanying text.
120. This purpose can be compared with the use of federal funds to encourage state
acceptance of federal requirements in welfare legislation. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447
(1923), the Supreme Court held that, since a state was not forced to accept the offer of federal funds,
state sovereignty was not infringed. In the present context, federal action is being used somewhat as
a "big stick" instead of as a "carrot" to encourage states voluntarily to resolve many of the
problems with a minimum of federal intervention. A comparison also can be made with the original
federal recommendation for federal restrictions on sales and use taxes unless the states enacted the
uniform sales and use tax act. See note 57, supra and accompanying text.
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probably be encouraged to seek membership in the Compact to take
advantage of the opportunity to help fashion their own multistate tax
policy instead of being tied to the more restrictive federal alternative.
Thus hopefully no state would choose to operate under the federal
alternative.
In summary, the proposed system would establish an express
commerce clause policy applicable to all states and businesses regardless
of whether the state chose to operate under the compact or the federal
alternative. It would guarantee uniformity because each state would be
subject to either the compact or the alternative interstate tax act. The
competition between federal and state governments over the control of
state taxation of interstate commerce would be lessened, if not
eliminated, since both would be participating. Finally, if "the protection
of the political balance of the federal system is the main purpose of the
compact clause, and if the protection of this political balance is
adequately safeguarded. . . merely by congressional consent, then it is
protected even more assuredly by a compact when there is not only
congressional consent, but actual and continuous participation by the
21
federal government."
VII.

CONCLUSION

One of the primary "needs" in federal-state relations is a
congressional statement of the scope of the common market protection
from state taxation given by the commerce clause. Such a statement
would solve the Supreme Court's present dilemma of trying to adjust
conflicting national and state interests without guidelines from
Congress. Action by the states, alone or collectively, neither can nor
should establish this policy. Only Congress, through direct federal
legislation or through federal participation in interstate cooperation, can
satisfy the dictate of the Constitution that "Congress shall have the
power to regulate commerce among the States." Direct federal
legislation is unpopular among the states primarily because of the
influence it would have on state taxing policy. Cooperative federal-state
action is preferable because the states should have a voice in a matter of
such vital concern as taxation.
The federal-state compact approach avoids the problems of having
the states, the Multistate Tax Compact, and the federal government
simultaneously trying to regulate and simplify state tax laws. In any one
state, business would be faced with either state law and the compact,'2
121.
122.

Grad,supranote 110, at846.
This proposition is based on the assumption that the state chose to join the compact.
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or with state law and federal law.'2 Furthermore, if the federal-state
compact did not work or ceased to exist, there would be an existing
federal law to implement as a solely federal solution. If the federal-state
compact functioned successfully, the states would not be saddled with a
federally mandated solution. There would be no jurisdictional standards
with their inherent tax preferences. Also, the states would have had a
major voice in shaping their tax policies to conform with national
interests. Finally, there would be a compact commission continuously at
work to stay abreast of current problems and to conduct studies and
make recommendations designed to achieve further simplicity and tax
1
equity. 2
JOSEPH W. MATHEWS, JR.
123.
124.

This statement assumes that the state chose not to join the compact.
This statement is premised on the provision of the current Multistate Tax Compact.

